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Well-designed and enforceable intellectual property rights (IPRs) provide economic 
incentives for research and development (R&D) and are, therefore, regarded as important 
determinants of technological progress and economic growth. Despite the apparent 
benefits to the existence of strong IPRs, many countries have a poor record in IPR 
protection (Helpman, 1993; Richardson and Gaisford, 1994). 
This is especially true in the developing world (Helpman, 1993) with prime 
examples being Argentina (where 50-80% of Roundup Ready soybean seeds grown are 
not purchased from the property right holder) and China (where Procter & Gamble 
estimates its annual losses due to counterfeiting to US$150 million). The estimates of 
annual costs of infringement to US firms vary between $24 billion for 1986 (U.S. 
International Trade Commission, 1988) and $2.3 billion (Feinberg and Rousslang, 1990). 
At the same time, private research in the agricultural sector has increased vastly 
compared to the public sector, thus showing the need for effective IPR protection 
(Moschini and Lapan, 1997). The importance of IPR infringement has been recognized 
and the issue has taken central stage in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs). Under the TRIPs agreement, countries can retaliate and 
penalize violations of their innovating firms’ IPRs in other countries. 
The issue of IPR infringement has inspired a number of studies on its economic 
ramifications. A case in point is the paper by Giannakas (2002) that develops a game-
theoretic model of heterogeneous producers to analyze the economic causes of IPR 
infringement and its consequences for the welfare of the groups involved, the pricing and 
adoption of an existing innovation. Giannakas’ analysis allows gauging the optimal 
enforcement policy of the government, the pricing strategy of the innovators and   2
technology adoption decisions when the technology in question has already been 
developed.  
Motivated by the effect of IPR protection on the incentives to innovate, this paper 
extends the framework of analysis developed in Giannakas (2002) by endogenizing the 
innovators’ decision to innovate. In particular, rather than taking the innovation as given, 
this paper explicitly considers the ramifications of IPR enforcement policies on the 
allocation of investment capital in R&D activity.   
The strategic interaction between the innovator, the government and the potential 
users of the new technology is modeled as a four stage sequential game. In stage 1 the 
innovator decides whether to invest in R&D and, if so, by how much. In stage 2, the 
government determines the level of protection it will provide to the innovating firm. Once 
the enforcement policy of the government has been determined, the innovator decides on 
the pricing of the new technology in stage 3. Finally, in stage 4, the potential users of the 
new technology decide whether to adopt this technology and, if so, whether to infringe on 
the innovator’s IPRs observing the enforcement policy in place as well as the nature and 
pricing of the new technology. To avoid Nash equilibria involving non-credible 
strategies, the game is solved using backward induction (Gibbons, 1992) with the 
corresponding outcome providing the subgame perfect equilibrium investment in R&D, 
enforcement of IPRs, pricing and adoption of the new technology. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic 
model with perfect enforcement. The second part of the paper extends the baseline model 
by incorporating infringement into the analysis and compares the resulting equilibrium to 
that of the analysis of the case where the innovator cannot price discriminate between   3




The baseline model uses the assumption of profit maximizing behavior of producers and 
innovators and the welfare optimization by the government to derive a sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium. To begin, consider the problem of the producer. 
 
Producer’s problem  
Producers have to decide on whether to grow the genetically modified (GM) or the 
conventional crop. Producers are assumed to differ in term of the returns they receive 
from the production of the two crops. Let  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ A  be the attribute that differentiates the 
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where the subscripts t and gm stand for traditional and genetically modified goods 
respectively. The prices pt and pgm are the prices of the farm output of traditional and 
genetically modified crops, respectively net of all costs except the cost of seeds. The 
superscript s on the price then denotes the price of the seed. The parameters γ and Φ are 
the return premium factors of conventional and GM crops depending on the type of the 
individual producer. Better producers will be able to achieve larger profits, regardless of 
the type of crop they are planting. The relative gains for a better producer, however,   4
differ between the GM crop and the conventional crop, represented by the difference in 
the return premium factors. Producers’ types are assumed to be uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1. The assumption of a uniform distribution simplifies the analysis 
significantly without diminishing the generalizability of the results. Typically the market 
price of conventional crops is higher than the price of GM crops, but at the same time 
also the cost of conventional seeds is higher. In order to assure a positive quantity of both 
traditional and genetically modified product we assume 
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The parameter AI also gives the market share of the GM product while 1- AI is the market 
share of the conventional product, as producers between type ‘AI‘ and type ‘1’ will prefer 
to produce the traditional product and producers between type ‘0’ and type ‘AI‘ will 
prefer to produce the GM product. Assuming that each producer produces only one unit, 
we can calculate the total supply of the GM product by simply multiplying the market 
share by the number of producers (H) in the market.  
 
Innovator’s problem 
Assuming fixed proportions between inputs and outputs, the supply of the GM product 
also gives the derived demand for GM seed (see Giannakas, 2002). The innovator 
maximizes profits by choosing a seed price that equates marginal revenue with marginal 













Assuming constant marginal costs the maximization yields following price/ quantity 
combination: 
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The government does not enter as an active player in this scenario since we assumed 
perfect enforcement. Contrary to the model in Giannakas (2002) the innovation decision 
is now endogenous. The paper by Giannakas assumed that innovation already took place 

























γ-Φ   6
arguing that the innovator can foresee the reaction by government and producers and will 
choose accordingly whether to innovate or not. This is an important extension because it 
explains from within the model why innovations might not occur. The decision of the 
innovator on whether to invest in R&D, is based on the comparison of expected payoff 
under investment and non-investment.
1 The innovator’s problem on this stage of the 
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The innovator maximizes profits by deciding ( [ ] ni i d , ∈ ) on whether to innovate (d=i) or 
not to innovate (d=ni). If the innovator decides not to innovate the profits will be zero. 
Innovation brings the innovator a positive profit if the equilibrium pricing 
∗ s
gm p  for the 
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1 Most studies confirm that higher IPRs encourage more R&D spending (Lesser, 1997). One exception is 
Levin et al. (1987).    7
Imperfect Enforcement 
Under imperfect enforcement the producer has the additional choice to obtain the GM 
seed illegally by either retaining it from past harvest or buying it from the black market. 
For simplicity, we assume that the cost of seed in this case is negligible and can be set to 
zero. Engaging in illegal activities, however, can result in detection and subsequent fines. 
The detection probability and the fine are denoted as δ and ρ. The detection probability is 
assumed to increase with the characteristic of the producer. The reasoning for this is that 
better producers are located in more accessible regions, have more unified parcels and are 
more attractive targets for tax revisions and other scrutiny due to their success. However, 
the actual detection probability is not only determined by the particular characteristic of 
the producer, but also by the resources (R) spent by the government. The more resources 
the government spends, the higher is the base detection probability. The respective profit 
functions for the producers are then 
  if conventional crop is produced 
  if GM crop is produced with seeds obtained legally 
  if GM crop is produced with seeds obtained illegally 
 
Figure two graphs the net return functions and depicts the determination of market shares 
of conventional crops (At), GM crops produced with seeds obtained legally (A
h
gm) and 
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Similar to the perfect enforcement case, the producer who is indifferent between the GM 





















Assuming fixed proportions between inputs and outputs the derived demand for the GM 
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The resulting price and quantity combination 
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show the equilibrium price charged by the innovator, as a function of the level of IPR 
protection and the respective quantity of legally purchased GM seeds. The quantity of 
seeds obtained illegally can then be calculated as 
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If the innovator is forced to exit the market it leaves a quantity for illegal seeds of 








H x . 
With imperfect enforcement, the enforcement of the government has to be taken 
into consideration to determine the outcome in the market. Assuming that the 
enforcement costs are not too high, the government wants to make sure that the innovator   10
is innovating, because domestic welfare is larger with innovation than without. Therefore 
it has to assure the innovator a payoff that covers not only the variable costs of 
production, but also at least some of the sunk costs of innovation. The maximization 
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where PS, TC, CS, REP, IR stand for producer surplus, taxpayer cost, consumer surplus, 
reputation cost and innovators’ rent respectively. Taxpayer cost is assumed to increase 
with an increase in protection as more resources have to be committed to the auditing 
process (Feinberg and Rousslang, 1990). Complete protection is almost impossible 
(Levin et al. 1987), indicating the rapid increase in cost for improved auditing. 
Reputation is a positive function of protection and captures the benefits of being seen as a 
lawful nation by other countries. Benefits can be realized through better trade agreements 
with other countries, more development aid, better investment grading etc. The first 
constraint is given to indicate that all governments together have to provide enough 
profits to at least cover some minimum innovators’ rent, in this case assumed to be equal 
to the R&D cost incurred by the innovator. Each government can have a different 
conjecture about the effect of changes in IPR protection in the home country on the 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that the government chooses to affect infringement primarily through auditing probability 
and not through changing the fines being charged. Due to justice considerations, the size of fines is 
determined by the severity of the crime (Stigler, 1970). Furthermore, Ostergard (2000) argues that looking 
at the actual enforcement of laws is more important than analyzing the law itself.    11










Furthermore, countries can be either small countries or large countries, depending on 
which a change in innovator rent accruing from the domestic market will have a different 
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With λ=0 the government either believes that its country is too small to matter, or a 
decrease in the innovator’s rent domestically will be substituted by an equal increase 
abroad. A conjecture of 0<λ<1 implies that the country is too small to matter itself, but a 
change in its innovator’s rent causes other countries to follow suit. This case is rather 
unlikely as typically only a large country can act as a leader in the market and we ignore 
it for the further analysis. A λ=1 implies that an increase in innovator’s rent in that 
country will increase the total innovator’s rent by the same margin. This occurs when the 
country under consideration is a large country and there is no cooperation occurring. 
Lastly, when λ is larger than one, a change in the innovator’s rent not only increases the 
total innovator’s rent by the same margin, but also causes other government to act in a 
cooperative way, thus increasing the total innovator’s rent further.   
The innovator’s rent is not part of the maximization process, since the analysis is 
about a developing country with presumably no domestic innovators. The second   12
constraint indicates that the government will provide sufficient protection for innovation 
only if it achieves a welfare gain over the welfare obtained under the optimal no-
innovation level of protection, found by equating marginal gain from reputation to 
marginal cost from enforcement. 
Given that the innovator actually is in the market, the producer surplus is given by 
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For the calculation of the consumer surplus we assume heterogeneous consumers with 
[] 1 , 0 ∈ c  being the attribute that differentiates the consumers. Higher values of c signify 
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U(c) is the willingness to pay of the consumer with attribute c and is assumed to be 
linearly decreasing in c. Assuming that both GM and conventional product exist in the 
market, the integral is equivalent to the average difference between the willingness to pay 
and the market price multiplied by the quantity consumed. We can show that producer 







). Further, an increase in 
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Both producer surplus as well as consumer surplus is negatively affected by increases in 
IPR protection. Explicitly taking the consumer surplus into consideration adds 
significantly to the complexity of the analysis because changes in the price of GM 
products will have an effect on producers’ decision to produce. Therefore, since no 
additional qualitative insights are gained, we henceforth (until the extension with trade) 
do not explicitly consider the consumer in the model.  
The innovator’s rent equals 
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its rent is zero and producer surplus can be calculated 
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If reputation costs are not significant (and for developing countries they do not 
seem to be very large), the government of a small country has no incentive to provide any 
IPR protection. This maximizes producer surplus (and consumer surplus) and minimizes 
taxpayer costs. At the same time the lack of protection will not influence the innovator’s 
decision to invest in R&D, since the contribution to the total innovator’s rent is   14
insignificant. This explains, why many developing countries offer very little IPR 
protection. For the large country, the optimal behavior depends on the conjecture they 
have about the behavior of the rest of the world. If the large country has a conjecture of 
λ=0, the optimal behavior is to free ride and reduce its own IPR protection to a minimum 
level. The expectation is that the rest of the world will make up for the loss in innovator’s 
rent, by increasing their IPR protection.
 3  With a conjecture of λ=1 the large country will 
have no incentive to change its IPR protection if the minimum innovator’s rent is exactly 
obtained. If more than the minimum innovator’s rent is provided, the large country will 
decide to decrease its IPR protection
4 and vice versa.
5 If the large country expects 
cooperation, i.e. λ>0, it will have an incentive to increase IPR protection if the 
innovator’s rent is below the minimum level required for innovation. The country will do 
so even if by itself it cannot provide sufficient innovator’s rent to enable the innovator to 
cover R&D costs. 
  The above analysis provides a framework for explaining the observed distribution 
of protection in the real world (e.g. developed countries protecting much, whereas 
developing countries protecting little). Most developing countries are small countries and 
thus have an incentive to choose very small rates of IPR protection. Developed countries 
are mostly large countries, but differ with regard to their conjectures. This explains why 
there is no uniform degree of IPR protection across countries. Another factor explaining 
the unequal distribution of IPR protection is, of course, that the reputation effect is much 
higher for developed countries than for developing countries and, thus, forces developed 
                                                 
3 Compare also to Yang (1998). He argues that Southern countries have the incentives to wait and see what 
the other countries are doing before deciding on a level of protection. If one country is forced to protect 
more, the other countries have incentive to protect less. 
4 If reputation costs are not too significant 
5 As long as taxpayer costs do not overcompensate the gain from enabling innovation   15
countries to protect more than they otherwise would. Furthermore, governments of 
developed countries consider the innovator’s rent in their welfare maximization, which 
might induce higher protection as well.  
 
No Price Discrimination 
The previous analysis assumes that the innovator can successfully price discriminate 
between producers from different countries. We will now consider the case where the 
innovator is unable to prevent resale of its technology between countries and is therefore 
unable to price discriminate. The producer faces the same decision as before, namely to 
produce the traditional crop, purchase the GM seed legally, or obtain the seed through 
some illegal channel. The innovator knows the optimal response by the producers and 
decides accordingly on the optimal price across countries. For the case of perfect 
enforcement this problem can be graphically illustrated for a two country case as shown 
in figure 3. The no-discrimination equilibrium price (p
s
gm) is a weighted average of the 
prices the innovator would have chosen for each country under price discrimination.  
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The price and quantity solutions to this problem then are: 
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The difference between the price charged by the innovator under no price discrimination 
and with price discrimination can be calculated as 
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As expected, the price will be higher for country one than with price discrimination, if the 
maximum price charged (B) in country two is relatively higher than in country one. 
Consequently, the country with the larger relative return premium will sell a lower 
quantity relative to the price discrimination: 
()
() ( ) ()
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2 1 1 2 2 2 1
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More interesting in the context of this paper is to look at the case with imperfect 
enforcement. Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium conditions in the markets under imperfect 
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Mathematically, the innovator’s problem can be stated as: 
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which can be solved for the optimal price and quantity (for each country).  
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Similar to the case of perfect enforcement, the price of GM seeds in country one will be 
higher than under price discrimination, if the maximum possible price charged by the 
innovator is larger in county two than in country one. Higher price results in lower 
quantity compared to the price discrimination case. 
Comparative statics allow us to calculate the effect of an increase in protection in 
one country on the price charged by the innovator. Specifically, and increase in the audit 
probability results in increased prices charged by the innovator, i.e.,  
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The intuition behind this result is that an increase in protection in country one will 
increase the relative profitability of purchasing genetically modified seeds legally in that   19
country. This in turn will increase the innovator’s derived demand (pivotal shift of the 
demand schedule to the right) which will increase the innovator’s profit maximizing price 
in that country. This causes the innovator to charge a higher international price, 
regardless of whether the country previously had a lower or higher price relative to the 
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The reason for this is that the increase in equilibrium quantity due to the increase in 
demand more than offsets the quantity reduction due to the price increase. 
It is also interesting to look at the effect of an increase in the effective total 
demand for traditional and GM crop. This might be caused by a general increase in 
income for the country under consideration or by a population increase.  
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An increase in the total demand in country one will increase prices charged by the 
innovator if the maximum price the innovator can charge in each country, 
() i i i i
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, is larger in country one than in country two. This is the case because a 
larger maximum price implies, ceteris paribus, a greater innovator surplus created within 
that country. This causes the innovator to place more weight on that country for the 
estimation of the international equilibrium price, and therefore lower the international   20
equilibrium price if the domestic equilibrium price was lower and increase the 
international equilibrium price if the domestic equilibrium price was higher. 
Similar to the price discrimination case the problem of the government is to 
determine the level of enforcement that maximizes domestic welfare subject to the 
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IR2 follows symmetrically and is not explicitly derived here. The producer surplus is 
derived as the area under the double kinked curve in figure 5 with the respective share 
being multiplied by the total population in that country. Mathematically, this can be 
shown for country one to equal  
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Figure 5 
 
Consistent with a priori expectations, the producer surplus is increased under price 
discrimination if the price is lower than that under no price discrimination. The increase 
in producer surplus is then given by: 
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Similar to the price discrimination case, an increase in protection will lead to an 
increase in innovator’s rent through increases in quantity and price. The increased price 
charged by the innovator causes the producer surplus to fall. Relative to the price 
discrimination case, producer surplus is less responsive to a change in protection
6, 
making the reputation effect and the enforcement costs relatively more important for the 
government decision. It should be noted that the previous discussion assumes that we 
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deal with a large country, as the innovator would otherwise not take the level of 
protection of that country into consideration for its profit maximizing price. It follows 
that a small country cannot affect the price of the GM seed by providing a different 
amount of protection. The producers still benefit, however, since infringing becomes 
cheaper. Due to the decreased cost of infringement, more producers choose to obtain GM 
seeds illegally, which consequently leads to a decreased market share of the innovator 
relative to the benchmark case of price discrimination. Producers also lose compared to 
the benchmark case, due to the decreased price responsiveness of the innovator.  
 
International Trade 
The next part of the paper focuses on the effect of IPR protection on international trade. 
Specifically, the analysis focuses on whether protection can be used as a strategic trade 
policy tool to increase exports.
7 In the following analysis we assume that we deal with a 
small sector; goods are traded internationally, but a change in net-exports does not result 
in changes in the terms-of-trade. This allows to model international trade as a simple one-
sector international demand and supply model. As before, we choose a sector with some 
crops being produced using traditional seeds and others being produced using GM seeds. 
Note that the goods traded are now consumer goods
8, not seeds, and thus the analysis 
focuses on the producer level, not input suppliers’ level. We assume that the trading 
sector is perfectly competitive and that trading costs are negligible. To further simplify 
the analysis, we also assume that countries are similar in all but the level of protection of 
GM products. The careful reader will notice that the previous sections of the paper imply 
                                                 
7 For a similar analysis on strategic labeling see Veyssiere and Giannakas (2004)  
8 created in fixed proportions from crops   23
that if countries are similar they also will choose similar levels of protection. Allowing 
for this inconsistency enables us, however, to more clearly gauge the effect of changes in 
property right protection. Similar to Chichilnisky (1994), we can now demonstrate that 
trade can be caused by differences in IPR protection itself.  
  Consumers now have to be modeled explicitly, as international demand and 
supply jointly determine trade flows. The analysis of the consumers follows closely the 
discussion in Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004). Each 
consumer is assumed to consume one unit of either the GM or the conventional product 
and the expenditure for this consumption represents only a small part of her budget. Let 
[] 1 , 0 ∈ c  be the attribute that differentiates the consumers. The consumer with 




c P U U
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− − = α
 
Subscripts gm and t on U represent the utility of consuming the product produced with 
GM crops and the product produced with conventional crops respectively. Similarly, 
these subscripts on P represent the price the consumer has to pay for the respective 
product. U is the base utility the consumer gains from consuming the product, whereas α 
is the positive utility discount factor associated with the consumption of the GM product.  
As shown in figure 6, given equal prices, consumers prefer the conventional over 
the GM product (i.e. conventional and GM products are vertically differentiated). The 
GM product is cheaper, however, which leads some consumers to demand GM products, 
whereas others demand the conventional product. 
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Figure 6 
 
The indifferent consumer is located at  
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This allows calculating the world demand as simply the summation of the individual 
country demands. Assuming equal α across countries, the two country case thus would 
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International trade with perfect enforcement 
Total supply of genetically modified products across countries is the sum of the total 
amounts of genetically modified products produced in each country, with seeds obtained 
either through infringement or legal purchases. Similarly, total supply for the traditional 













With similar conditions in both countries the supply curves for the GM product 
and the conventional product under perfect enforcement are: 
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The amount exported/imported by each respective country can then be calculated as the 
difference between the quantity supplied by a country at the equilibrium price and the 



































Since all countries are the same and world price is equal to the domestic price there is no 
international trade in this scenario.  
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International trade with infringement 
The next step is to consider the case in which producers actually infringe. In this case, the 
demand analysis remains the same, but world supply becomes:  
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Clearly, world supply of the GM product depends negatively on the degree of intellectual 
property protection in each country, 
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World supply of the traditional product, on the other hand, depends positively on the 







t S ). An increase in the IPR 
protection in any country is, thus, equivalent to a left shift of the world supply curve of 
GM crops. This will increase world price for genetically modified food and decrease the 
equilibrium quantity in the market. The inverse world supply of the GM product is then: 
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Equating this to world demand for the GM product yields equilibrium quantities and 
prices of: 
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The quantity exported by a country then can be calculated by subtracting domestic 
demand at from the domestic supply the world price.   29
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As we can see, this expression is positive as long as levels of protection are higher in 
country 2 than in the home country. The intuitive explanation is that higher levels of IPR 
protection increase the cost to the producers as they have to purchase the respective good 
from the innovator rather than simply copy it. This increase in the cost of production 
reduces production and exports to the world market (see also Lesser, 1997). This is 
equivalent to a negative first derivative of net-exports with respect to the protection 
probability: 
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Small Open Economy 
For a small open economy the domestic price is determined by the world price. In the two 
country case, this implies that the world price is equal to the price level determined by 
demand and supply relationships in the large country (country two). Figure 9 shows the 
effect of a decrease in IPR protection on exports on country one. In the original position 
the home country had a level of protection that caused a supply schedule of S. With the   30
given world price determined by country two, the quantity produced domestically is Q1 
and the quantity demanded is Q2. Country one is therefore a net-importer. After the 
decrease in protection, however, the supply schedule in country one shifts to the right and 
increases the amount produced domestically to Q’. This implies that the country becomes 
now a net-exporter, with exports being the difference between Q’ and Q2.  
 
Figure 9 



















− + − + −
φ γ ρ δ φ γ
ρ δ φ γ φ γ
 
which gives rise to  
() ( ) ( )
() () ( ) ( ) [] φ γ ρ δ φ γ ρ δ φ γ α
ρ δ φ γ α α ρ δ φ γ
− + − + + −



















Q2  Q1 
S’
Q’   31
Using the world price to determine the supply and demand in the home country, we get: 
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Similar to the large country case, net-exports are positive as long as protection in the rest 
of the world is higher than in the home country. Furthermore, net-exports will decrease 
with an increase in IPR protection.  
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Comparing the small open economy and the large country case, we can observe that net-
exports (imports)
9 are higher in a small open economy. This can easily be explained by 
the fact that, if a large country decreases the IPR protection, the increase in the total 
quantity produced affects the world price which alleviates the benefit from increasing the 
quantity in the first place. This will lead to a smaller supply response by large countries 
than smaller countries. 
 
 
                                                 
9 If IPR protection is lower in the small country than the rest of the world, the small country will have net-
exports. In that case the net-exports are higher than with a large country with comparable market 
conditions. If IPR protection is higher in the small country than the rest of the world, the small country will 
have net-imports, again higher than a large country with comparable market conditions.   32
Effectiveness of IPR protection without price discrimination 
The effect of a change in IPR protection on trade flows, when the innovator is unable to 
price discriminate, can be deduced from results obtained in the previous sections of this 
paper. If price discrimination is not possible for the innovator, a change in IPR protection 
cannot change net-exports when market conditions are similar across countries. Without 
price discrimination, the innovator will react to a decrease in IPR protection in a large 
country by reducing the GM seed price in all countries. Consequently, all producers 
benefit from the price reduction and expand their production. This will lead to an increase 
in world supply which will result in a decrease in world price for GM crops. Since the 
effect is symmetric for all countries (since they all have similar market conditions), there 
is an increase in the world quantity of GM crops, but not a change in the quantity 
exported. Despite the ineffectiveness with regard to net-exports a reduction in IPR 
protection still benefits the domestic producers, because infringement becomes cheaper. 
Producer surplus is therefore larger. Obviously, a change of IPR protection in a small 
country has no effect on the pricing decision of the innovator and therefore will not 
change the total supply and world price for GM crops.  
  If IPR protection goes below the threshold of  ( )








ρ δ0 , however, 
the innovator exits the market and a positive net effect on exports can be observed. Even 
if the innovator is not forced to exit the market, producers can still benefit from a 
decrease in IPR protection. Due to the reduction in infringement cost, a larger quantity of 
the GM crop is produced with seeds obtained illegally. The reason is, of course, that it is 
now cheaper for the producer to do so. At the same time, the overall quantity does not 
increase as the increase in GM crops produced with illegally obtained seeds is exactly   33
offset by a reduction in seeds obtained legally. This implies that protection does not have 
an effect on total exports or imports, but will increase the profitability of production.  
   34
Conclusion 
This paper builds on the research presented in Giannakas (2002). The first extension is to 
endogenize the innovation decision of the innovator. Innovators will only engage in R&D 
activity if the expected payoff is sufficiently large. The government has to take this into 
consideration when deciding on the optimal level of protection. It is shown that the 
optimal choice of the government depends not only on the pricing decision of the 
innovator, but also on its conjecture about the policy of other governments and its country 
size. It turns out that for a small country a minimum level of protection is optimal.
10 For a 
large country, the choice of protection depends on the conjecture about other countries’ 
behavior. If the large country expects other countries to behave cooperatively it has an 
incentive to free ride. Otherwise the large country will decide to contribute to the total 
innovator’s rent, depending on the starting position.  
The second extension analyses the effect of assuming the inability of the 
innovator to price discrimination between countries. The analysis shows that, similar to 
before, an increase in IPR protection will cause the innovator to increase prices. This only 
happens, however, if the country under consideration is a large country in the sense that it 
affects the innovator’s rent. One of the most interesting results is that an increase in the 
effective demand for seeds will result in increased (decreased) GM seed prices over time, 
if the starting markup difference between GM seed and traditional seed is smaller (larger) 
than in other countries.   
The last extension introduces international trade into the analysis. More 
specifically it analyzes whether IPR protection can be used as a strategic trade policy tool 
                                                 
10 This supports the conclusion of a more complex model introduced by Helpman (1993)     35
as suggested by Giannakas (2002). Results show that a decrease in IPR protection will 
lead to a smaller price charged by the innovator, which will increase the production of 
GM products. If the country under consideration is a large country, this will increase 
world supply and thus lower the world price of the GM product. This will alleviate the 
net-effect on supply. Independently of whether the country is small or large, however, a 
decrease in IPR protection will lead to an increase in net-exports. If price discrimination 
is possible, IPR protection can therefore be used as a strategic trade tool.
11  
If price discrimination is not possible for the innovator, a change in IPR 
protection cannot change net-exports as long as market conditions are similar across 
countries. Without price discrimination the innovator will react to a decrease in IPR 
protection in a large country by reducing the GM seed price in all countries. Due to the 
symmetry assumed in this model, there is an increase in the world quantity of GM crops, 
but not a change in the amount exported. Producer surplus increases, however, since 
infringing becomes cheaper. A change of IPR protection in a small country has no effect 
on the pricing decision of the innovator. This is implies that world supply for GM crops 
will not change and thus world price of GM crops will stay the same. Within the small 
country there is simply a shift from legally purchased seeds to illegally obtained seeds 
without a change in net-exports. 
We can conclude therefore that intellectual property right protection can only be 
used effectively to boost exports if the innovator can price discriminate. However, 
regardless of the price discrimination ability of the innovator, a decrease in IPR 
protection will always increase producer surplus. 
                                                 
11 A similar result has been shown by Taylor (1993)   36
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